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On August 21, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Thilo Brown's
motion to be resentenced.2 Brown attempted to rely on the Supreme Court's decision
in Johnson v. United States,3 which declared the residual clause of the Armed Career
Criminal Act ("ACCA") unconstitutional.4 Because Brown was sentenced under an
identical clause in the federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") when the
Guidelines were still mandatory, Brown argued that his enhanced sentence as a
"career offender" was also unconstitutional.5 Relying on Supreme Court precedent,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Brown's motion was not based on a newly
recognized right and, therefore, was untimely.
6
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all concluded
that an individual sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines
does not have a timely § 2255(f)(3) claim under Johnson v. United States.7
The Supreme Court denied certiorari and declined to address whether Brown could
rely on the right recognized in Johnson.' In a dissent from the order, Justice
Sotomayor noted the decision not to hear the case "denies petitioners, and perhaps
more than 1,000 like them, a chance to challenge the constitutionality of their
sentences."9 Although the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, at least one
circuit has concluded that the right announced in Johnson is broad enough to include
individuals sentenced under an identical residual clause in the mandatory
Guidelines.'°
This Note explores the scope of the right announced in Johnson and concludes
that individuals sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines
have a meritorious claim to be resentenced under § 2255(f)(3). Part I of this Note
outlines the sentencing process and how a defendant may attack a sentence under
§ 2255. Part II reviews the decision in Johnson and the Court's clarifications in later
cases. Part III analyzes the arguments about the scope of the right announced in
Johnson. Part IV concludes that the right announced in Johnson extends to
individuals sentenced under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines regime.
I. THE SENTENCING PROCESS
This Note focuses on individuals sentenced as "career offenders" under the
mandatory sentencing regime. The first Part highlights several important aspects of
the sentencing process. Section A gives a brief history of the sentencing Guidelines
and the transition from mandatory to advisory Guidelines. Section B continues by
outlining the introduction of the career offender designation and the impact this has
on a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines. Section C concludes by explaining
2 United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 298-99 (4th Cir. 2017).
3 Id. at 300.
4 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
' Brown, 868 F.3d at 300.
6 Id. at 303-04.
7 United States v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Green, 898 F.3d
315, 316 (3d Cir. 2018); Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625,627 (6th Cir. 2017).
8 Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2018).
9 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
'0 Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 2018).
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the process by which a petitioner may attack a sentence he believes has become
unconstitutional through 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Specifically, the Note focuses on the
one-year limitation on motions to attack a sentence after the Supreme Court has
announced a new right.1 '
A. History of the Guidelines
Before 1987, the trial court exercised almost complete discretion over the
sentence given to a convicted offender.12 On review, the appellate court gave
"virtually unconditional deference" to the sentencing judge's discretion.'3 This
discretionary regime led to disparities in sentefices, and critics questioned the success
of a rehabilitative model of sentencing.'4 In place of this regime, Congress
established the United States Sentencing Commission "to devise guidelines to be
used for sentencing."'5 These "guidelines were meant to establish a range of
determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various
specified factors."'6 The Guidelines became effective in 1987.1' The Guidelines,
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, "ha[d] the force and effect of laws,
prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive. A judge who disregards
them [would] be reversed."'8 In 2005, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Booker,
held that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right
to ajury trial, and it made the Guidelines advisory.'9 This Note focuses on individuals
sentenced under the mandatory version of the Sentencing Guidelines from 1987 to
2005.
B. Career Offender Designation
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to establish a number of
sentencing goals and policies to implement those goals.2 0 The Sentencing
Commission explained one portion of the Sentencing Reform Act as follows:
The SRA directs the Commission to "assure that the guidelines specify a
sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term
authorized by statute" for offenders ... who have been convicted of a
crime of violence ... and who previously have been convicted of two or
more such offenses.
2'
28 U.S.C. § 2255(t)(3) (2018).
12 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTr&ARThuR R MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcCE AND PROCEDURE § 521 (4ih ed. 2011).
13 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,364 (1989) (citing Maurice Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion
of the Trial Court, Viewedfrom Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 663 (1971)).14 Id. at 365.
"15 d. at 367.16 Id. at 368.
17 3 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at § 521.
18 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"9 United States. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 245 (2005).
20 U.S. SENTENCING COMM 'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OFGUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN AssEssMENTF OF How WELL
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHiEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 11 (2004).
21 Id. at 133.
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This directive resulted in the "career offender" guideline.22 Individuals sentenced
under this guideline have received "some of the most severe penalties imposed under
the guidelines."'23 Under this guideline, a crime of violence includes any crime that
"has an element [of] use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another."24 The guideline identifies specific offenses that are "crimes
of violence" and includes a catch-all provision for "conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another."2 5 The catch-all provision has come to be
known as the residual clause.26 If an individual had two convictions that were
considered crimes of violence under the residual clause, the Guidelines deemed him
a career offender and made him subject to a near maximum sentence.
27
C. § 2255 Motions
After direct review of a criminal sentence is complete, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the
mechanism by which an individual can obtain judicial review of his sentence.28
Congress limited the availability of § 2255 relief in 1996 with the passage of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). 29 In the AEDPA,
Congress imposed a one-year statute of limitations period on motions to attack a
sentence that included limited exceptions.3" Normally, a petitioner has one year to
attack a sentence after the judgment becomes final.31 One exception to this statute of
limitations gives a petitioner a new one-year period to attack the sentence from
"the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court,
if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review."
32
In Dodd v. United States, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether the
first or second clause of the exception in § 2255(f)(3) determines the date from which
this statute of limitations runs.3 Dodd argued that he second clause governs the
statute of limitations, and the statute of limitations could not begin until the right
recognized by the Supreme Court was made retroactive.34 The Court concluded that
the first clause governs, and the statute of limitations began to run on the date the
12 Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2018).
23 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 21, at 133.
24 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2018).
25 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(aX2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015) (amended 2018).
Note that the Guidelines were revised in 2016 to remove this residual clause. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL app. C supp., amend. 798 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
26 United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Johnson v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 2551, 2555-56 (2015).
27 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2018).
28 Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C.
L. REv. 79, 89 (2012).
29 Id. at 96.
'0 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(0 (2018).
"' 28 U.S.C. § 2255(0(1) (2018).
32 Id. § 2255(0(3).
33 Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 354-55 (2005).
34 Id. at 357-58.
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asserted right was recognized by the Supreme Court.35 The Court determined the
second clause was meant to limit the applicability of the section to cases where the
recognized right had been made retroactive, but not meant to serve as a prerequisite
for the statute of limitations.36 Recognizing that this may cause harsh results in the
case of successive § 2255 motions, the Court noted that the text of the statute
reflected a congressional intent to create stringent procedural requirements for the
retroactive application of rules.
37
In effect, this decision requires a petitioner to file a motion within a year of the
Supreme Court recognizing a new right, even if the right has not yet been made
retroactively applicable. If not, the petitioner risks being time-barred by § 2255(f).
38
In some instances, this will force a petitioner to interpret the scope of the Court's
holding when determining whether to file a petition under § 2255. This places
petitioners in a potential catch-22: if they do not interpret a right broadly enough,
they may be time-barred, but if they interpret the right too broadly, their claims may
be denied, and they'll be forced to run an even longer procedural gauntlet to file a
successive § 2255 motion.
Because the Supreme Court's initial recognition of a right triggers the beginning
of the one-year statute of limitations, it is important to understand how the Supreme
Court declares a new right upon which a criminal may rely in sentencing cases., If
Johnson broadly described a right, petitioners hoping for relief need to have filed
within a year of Johnson to obtain relief. If not, they must wait on a ripe claim for
the Supreme Court to address the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines
explicitly.39
II. JOHNSON AND ITS PROGENY
This Part of the Note discusses the Court's decision in Johnson that declared the
residual clause of the ACCA unconstitutionally vague. From there, it reviews the
decision that made the right retroactively applicable and the decision that declared
that the residual clause of the advisory guidelines is not subject to vagueness
challenges. Reviewing this line of decisions provides the background necessary to
analyze whether the right announced in Johnson extends to individuals sentenced
under the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines.
A. Johnson v. United States
In Johnson, the Supreme Court declared the residual clause of the ACCA
unconstitutionally vague.4" The residual clause defined a "violent felony" as "any
crime... that... involves conduct hat presents aserious potential risk ofphysical
35Id. at 357.
36
Id. at 358-59.37 
Id. at 359-60.
3828 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2018).
9 Waiting to assert a ripe claim may be contrary to the AEDPA's goal of promoting finality with
respect o sentencing. United States v. Hammond, 351 F. Supp. 3d 106, 129 (D.D.C. 2018).
" Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557, 2563 (2015).
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injury to another."' The sentencing court determined that hree of Johnson's prior
convictions qualified as violent felonies, increasing his sentence to fifteen years.
4 2
The case arose out of Samuel Johnson's conviction for being a felon in possession
of a firearm.43 Initially, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether Johnson's
prior conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun qualified as a violent
felony under the residual clause, but on re-argument, the Court took up the issue of
whether the residual clause violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.' Prior to concluding that the residual clause was unconstitutional, the
Court had attempted, on four previous occasions, to apply the clause to various state
criminal offenses.
45
The Due Process Clause prohibits a criminal law that is "so vague that it fails to
give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it
invites arbitrary enforcement."4 6 This principle applies to statutes that fix
sentences. 4 1 When determining whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony, the
Court does not look at the crime of the individual offender, but instead it uses the
categorical approach and looks at the ordinary case of how the law defines the
offense.48 The Court determined that the use of the of the categorical approach was
appropriate in this case.49 Applying the categorical approach to the residual clause,
the Court found that the residual clause violated the Due Process Clause because the
clause "combin[ed] indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime
with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent
felony."'50
The Court's repeated failures to craft a principled standard further supported the
conclusion that the ACCA's residual clause was unconstitutionally vague.5 Even
though the Court had found that some prior convictions fit into the residual clause,
its holdings "squarely contradict he theory that a vague provision is constitutional
merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's
grasp. '5 2 The government argued that this would put other criminal laws that used
4" Id. at 2555-56 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012)). This language is identical to the residual
clause in the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2015) (amended 2018) (nothing that a "crime of violence ... involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another").4 2 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
43 Id.
44Id.
41 Id; see generally Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 4 (2011) (finding that an intentional flight in a vehicle
is a violent felony); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122,123 (2009) (holding that the failure to report was not
a violent felony); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 139 (2008) (holding that a DUI is not a violent felony);
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007) (holding that attempted burglary is a violent felony).
4 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)).47 Id. at 2557.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2562. There is a debate about the merits of the categorical approach, but that discussion is
beyond the scope of this Note. The Supreme Court recently rejected a challenge to viability of the
categorical approach. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2327 (2019) (rejecting an attempt to
save a residual clause by using a case-specific approach instead of the categorical approach).
5 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.
51 id.
52 Id. at 2561.
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the term "substantial risk" in "constitutional doubt," but the Court rejected this
contention by pointing out that the residual clause was invalid because it applied its
"serious potential risk" standard to the categorical approach that considers an
"idealized ordinary case of the crime."53 Although the Court concluded it was
unconstitutional to enhance a criminal's sentence using the indeterminate language
of the residual clause, the Court did not address the retroactivity of the rule it
announced.
54
B. Welch v. United States
In Welch v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether the right
announced in Johnson applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.55 Gregory
Welch was sentenced under the ACCA in 2010 before Johnson was decided.56 The
Court used the Teague framework to determine whether Johnson is retroactive.57
Under the Teague framework, the general rule is that new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not apply to cases decided before the new rule is
announced.58 But there are two exceptions to the general rule.59 New substantive
rules and new "watershed rules of criminal procedure" apply retroactively.' A new
rule is substantive if it "place[s] particular conduct or persons covered by the statute
beyond the State's power to punish."' The Court concluded that the decision in
Johnson was substantive because it limited the range of conduct the ACCA
punishes.62 As a result, the Court concluded the decision in Johnson retroactively
applied to individuals sentenced under the residual clause.
6 3
The decision in Welch made it clear that individuals convicted under the residual
clause of the ACCA before the decision in Johnson could use § 2255 to seek
collateral review of their sentences.6' According to the rule set forth in Dodd,
petitioners would need to have filed a motion under § 2255(0(3) within a year of
Johnson because the Johnson Court announced the right, not within a year of Welch
which made the right retroactive.65 While this decision was a victory for individuals
sentenced pre-Johnson under the residual clause of the ACCA, it was still unclear
whether the scope of Johnson extended beyond the residual clause of the ACCA.
53 Id.
14 See id. at 2563.
"' Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016).
16 Id. at 1262.
17 Id. at 1264.
58 Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)).
59 Id.
60 id.
61 Id. at 1264-65 (quoting Scriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004)).
621d. at 1265.
63 Id. at 1268.
64Id. at 1265.
65 See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 358-59 (2005).
2019-2020
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C. Beckles v. United States
In Beckles, the Court examined whether the decision in Johnson rendered the
residual clause in the advisory Guidelines unconstitutionally vague.66 Beckles was
convicted in 2007 for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and deemed a
career offender under the residual clause of the Guidelines.67 The district court
sentenced Beckles to 360 months in prison in accordance with the Guidelines'
recommended range.68 Beckles argued that because the residual clause in the
Guidelines was identical to the ACCA's residual clause that the Johnson Court held
unconstitutional, Johnson had determined Beckles's sentence was void for
vagueness.69 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas concluded that "the advisory
Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause."7
A criminal law is unconstitutional when it is "'so vague that it fails to give
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement."'7' Under the "void for vagueness" doctrine, the Court has
invalidated criminal laws "that define criminal offenses and laws that fix the
permissible sentences for criminal offenses.72 Johnson applied the vagueness rule
to a statute that fixes permissible sentences.73 But "[u]nlike the ACCA, however, the
advisory Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences.74 Because the
Guidelines "merely guide the district courts' discretion, the Guidelines are not
amenable to a vagueness challenge.75 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
petitioner's claim that the residual clause of the advisory Guidelines was
unconstitutional failed because the advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness
challenges.
76
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for
immunizing the advisory Guidelines as a whole from vagueness challenges.77 Justice
Sotomayor argued that the Guidelines "play a central role" in fixing sentences, even
after the Court determined that they no longer bind federal courts.78 In a footnote,
Justice Sotomayor pointed out the majority's overly broad opinion:
The Court's adherence to the formalistic distinction between mandatory
and advisory rules at least leaves open the question whether the defendants
sentenced to terms of imprisonment before our decision in United States
v. Booker-that is, during the period in which the Guidelines did "fix the
66 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017).
67 Id. at 890-91.
61 Id. at 891.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 890.
71 Id. at 892 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 894.
76 Id. at 890.
71 Id. at 898 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 899.
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permissible range of sentences,"--may mount vagueness attacks on their
sentences.
79
This concurring opinion played a significant role in the development of the current
circuit split.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT ANNOUNCED IN JOHNSON
This Part explores the arguments that have led to the circuit split. It begins by
exploring the majority approach to the issue, which has concluded that individuals
sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines do not have timely
claims. While this answer at first may appear to be correct, a deeper review of the
Court's characterization of Johnson makes it clear that the scope of the right
announced in Johnson includes individuals sentenced under the residual clause of
the mandatory Guidelines.
A. The Right Announced in Johnson is Limited to the ACCA, and therefore
the Motion is Untimely
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Brown illustrates the circuits' majority approach
to individuals sentenced under the mandatory Guidelines who attempt to rely on
Johnson for relief. Within one year of Johnson, Brown filed a motion to vacate his
sentence, arguing that one of his prior convictions could no longer qualify him for
"career offender" status and, thus, an enhanced sentence.8" Brown argued that the
decision in Johnson invalidated not just the residual clause of the ACCA, but also
the identically worded residual clauses in the Guidelines.81 Although Brown
acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles held that Johnson did
not apply to the advisory Guidelines, he nonetheless argued that the mandatory
Guidelines "cabined a sentencing judge's discretion in a manner that raises the same
concerns animating the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson."
82
In rejecting this claim, the Fourth Circuit relied on two separate arguments. First,
the court rejected Brown's claim that Johnson established the right for individuals
sentenced under the residual clause in the mandatory Guidelines to be resentenced.83
The court read Johnson as narrowly addressing the constitutionality of the residual
clause of the ACCA 84 Because the decision in Johnson did not discuss the
mandatory Guidelines' residual clause, Johnson did not create a right on which
Brown could rely.85
Next, the court addressed Brown's claim that a reading of Booker through
Beckles established the right to be resentenced because the Beckles Court specifically
79 Id. at 903 n.4 (citations omitted).
80 United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d. 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2017).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 302.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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limited its holding to the advisory version of the Guidelines.8 6 Here, the Court turned
to a plain language approach to interpret the statute.87 After looking at the
Merriam-Webster definition of "recognized," the court concluded that "if the
existence of a right remains an open question as a matter of Supreme Court
precedent, then the Supreme Court has not 'recognized' that right."'8 8 The court
latched onto a footnote in Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Beckles and concluded
that the Supreme Court explicitly left the right Brown asserted as an open question.
89
Therefore, the court concluded that Brown did not have a timely petition under §
2255(f)(3) because he did not assert a right initially recognized by the Supreme
Court.90
While the Brown decision is not an exact replica of the other circuit decisions, it
illustrates the two main arguments against claims that Johnson created a right to be
resentenced for individuals sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory
Guidelines. The Ninth Circuit added another point worth noting. After it concluded
that the right in Johnson was narrower than the petitioner claimed,9 the court
highlighted the Supreme Court's admonition "against framing [the Supreme Court's]
precedents at such a high level of generality."2
This interpretation of § 2255(f)(3), in conjunction with the right announced in
Johnson, is certainly plausible. Given the adoption of this interpretation by four of
the federal courts of appeal, it is clear that the interpretation has an immediate,
persuasive effect. A plain reading of the statute, in combination with Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence in Beckles, could persuasively foreclose the possibility of
timeliness for individuals sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory
Guidelines. But upon a deeper review of the Supreme Court's interpretation of §
2255(f)(3) and its decision in Johnson, the circuits' majority approach concluding a
petitioner such as Brown does not have a timely case is misguided.
B. The Right Announced in Johnson Forbids the Courts from Fixing a Sentence
Using the Unconstitutionally Vague Language of the Residual Clause
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to conclude that individuals sentenced
under the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines have a right to be resentenced
under Johnson.93 A close review of Dodd shows that such criminals do have a timely
claim, and thus courts should consider the substantive nature of the claimn. The
Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya counsels that the right announced
in Johnson is broad enough to include criminals sentenced under the residual clause
of the mandatory Guidelines.9 Further, the residual clause in the mandatory
86 Id.
87 Id. at 301.
88Id.
89 Id. at 299, 302.
90 Id. at 304.
9' United States v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2018).
92 Id. at 1026 (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014)).
93 Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 2018).
94 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).
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Guidelines suffers from the same two fatal deficiencies as the residual clause in the
ACCA that was invalidated in Johnson.
9 5
i. Timeliness of § 2255 Claim
In Dodd, the Supreme Court made clear that the timeliness question in a
§ 2255(f)(3) claim is determined by the first clause in the provision.96 Thus, an
individual sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines has a
timely claim if he filed a § 2255 motion within one year from "the date on which the
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court."97 The Seventh Circuit
concluded the arguments accepted by the other circuits "improperly read[] a merits
analysis into the limitations period." 8 Requiring that the petitioner prove that the
right in Johnson applied to his situation would "require reading 'asserted' out of the
statute.9 9 Thus, the purported plain language of the statute would be contrary to
another "theory of' statutory construction which attempts to give effect to every
word of a statute."° Additionally, reading a merits requirement into the first clause
would make "newly recognized by the Supreme Court" in the second clause of §
2255(f)(3) superfluous. Judge Howell provided further analysis of this issue in
United States v. Hammond.1"' She pointed out that requiring the petitioner to prove
the right applied to him "emphasizes the wrong clause" of§ 2255(f)(3).2 Thus, "[i]f
the petitioner seeks the benefit of a right purportedly recognized by the Supreme
Court within the preceding year, the petition is timely."' 3
Under this view of § 2255(f)(3), individuals sentenced under the residual clause
of the mandatory Guidelines would have a timely claim if they filed the motion
within one year of the Court's decision in Johnson. One immediate concern this may
raise is that individuals would raise frivolous claims by asserting rights the Supreme
Court has clearly not recognized. But the second clause of § 2255(f)(3) provides
courts with a tool to summarily dismiss claims based on rights the Supreme Court
has not "'newly recognized . . .' or 'made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.""' By following the Court's guidance in Dodd to determine when
the statute of limitations begins to run, this interpretation of § 2255(f)(3) most
accurately describes the requirements a petitioner must satisfy to bring a timely
§ 2255 claim. Therefore, if individuals filed claims about the constitutionality of a
clause identical to the ACCA's residual clause within one year of Johnson, the
petitions should be timely.
95 id.
96 Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S 353, 358 (2005) ("Paragraph 6(3) identifies one date and one date
only as the date from which the 1-year limitation period runs: 'the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court."').
97 28 U.S.C. § 2255(0(3) (2018).
9' Cross, 892 F.3d at 293.
99 Id. at 294.
" Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
'0' 351 F. Supp. 3d 106, 119 (D.D.C. 2018).
102 Id. at 120.
103 Id.
" Id. (quoting Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 358 (2005)).
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ii. Merits of§ 2255 Claim
Even if an individual sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory
Guidelines has a timely § 2255 claim, he must still show that the Supreme Court has
recognized the asserted right and made it retroactive.'05 By concluding that such
claims are not timely, the majority approach of the federal circuits has not reached
this question. While the majority approach does not reach the issue, many of the
arguments that the § 2255 motion is untimely overlap with a substantive
consideration of the merits of such a motion. Before evaluating these arguments, the
Note first argues that the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines suffers from
the same two fatal deficiencies outlined in Johnson.
In Johnson, the Court invalidated the residual clause of the ACCA because the
combination of two features created more indeterminacy than the Due Process
Clause allows.' The first feature was the uncertainty judges faced in using the
categorical approach to estimate "the risk posed by a crime.""0 7 In the words of
Justice Scalia, "[t]he residual clause offers no reliable way to choose between
[] competing accounts of what 'ordinary' attempted burglary involves."'0 8 While this
risk alone would not have been enough to violate the Due Process Clause, when
combined with a second form of indeterminacy, the residual clause violated the Due
Process Clause."° The second form of indeterminacy comes from the "serious
potential risk" standard." 0 Applying this standard to a "judge-imagined abstraction,"
the residual clause of the ACCA created a level of unpredictability that the Due
Process Clause will not tolerate in a statute that fixed sentences.I"
The residual clause of the Guidelines suffers from these same deficiencies."
12
This is easily seen because the two clauses are "materially identical" and include the
"serious potential risk" standard."3 The Supreme Court has required the use of the
categorical approach for the ACCA because of the textual focus on "convictions"
and the impracticability of asking a sentencing court to evaluate the conduct
underlying a conviction that occurred long ago."4 The "career offender" Guideline
uses the same "convictions" language and presents the same difficulty of
reconstructing the conduct of a prior conviction." I Moreover, like the ACCA, the
105 28 U.S.C. § 2255(0(3) (2018).
' Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557-58 (2015).
107 Id. at 2557.
108 Id. at 2558.
109 Id.
11 Id.
111 Id.
112 Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 299-300 (7th Cir. 2018).
113 id.
114 Id. at 300-01. Looking to the underlying conduct might also raise concerns under the Apprendi v.
New Jersey case. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In that case, the Court held that "any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. By using the categorical approach, a court does not raise
concerns of finding facts about the nature of a past offense that cause a sentencing enhancement in
violation of Apprendi.
115 Cross, 892 F.3d at 300-01.
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mandatory version of the Guidelines fixed the sentence of the criminal.1 16 Therefore,
the right to not have a sentenced fixed by the unconstitutionally vague residual clause
of the ACCA should equally apply to its twin, the residual clause of the mandatory
Guidelines.
The Brown court would respond immediately by saying that the right announced
in Johnson is narrowly limited specifically to the residual clause of the ACCA.II 7
But as a D.C. district court noted, this is simply because "[t]he constitutional question
came to the court packaged as an ACCA case.118 A dissent in Johnson argued that
striking this clause could invalidate numerous laws that employ similar or identical
standards.119 Instead of simply saying the decision was limited to the residual clause
of the ACCA, the majority responded that most other statutes that employ similar
language would not come into "constitutional doubt" because they do not require
applying the serious potential risk standard to "imagined crimes.'"120 Therefore, the
decision in Johnson should apply to vague laws that suffer from the same two
deficiencies that made the ACCA residual clause unconstitutional.
The Court's decision in Dimaya further illustrates that the right announced in
Johnson is not limited to the residual clause of the ACCA. That case involved a
statute that allowed removal of an alien who was convicted of an aggravated
felony. 21 One of the definitions of "aggravated felony" included a "crime of
violence."'22 The definition of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16 included a
residual clause with the same two features that were "constitutionally problematic"
for the residual clause of the ACCA.'23 The Court described this case as a
"straightforward application" of the Johnson decision.24 Because § 16's residual
clause had the same defects as the ACCA's residual clause, "Johnson effectively
resolved the case now before [the Court]."1 25 As the Hammond court pointed out, the
Dimaya Court cited only one case in its discussion of the constitutionality of § 16's
residual clause: Johnson.126 This language in Dimaya shows that the Court was
simply applying a right announced in Johnson, not breaking any new ground. This
reading of Dimaya supports the conclusion that the right announced in Johnson
applies beyond the residual clause of the ACCA to "vague laws that 'fix the
permissible sentences for criminal offenses. '-127
One possible counterargument o this reading of Dimaya is that the Beckles
decision "made clear" that the Johnson decision does "not automatically apply to all
116 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The Sentencing
Guidelines] have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive.
A judge who disregards them [would] be reversed." (citation omitted)).
117 See United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2017).
11 United States v. Hammond, 351 F. Supp. 3d 106, 126 (D.D.C. 2018).
'9 Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2577 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
12
0 
id.
121 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018).
1
22 Id. at 1211.
121 Id. at 1213.
1
24 id.
125 Id.
126 United States v. Hammond, 351 F. Supp. 3d 106, 127 (D.D.C. 2018) (ciingDnaya, 138 S. Ct at 1214-16).
127 d. at 126 (quoting Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017)).
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similarly worded [] clauses."'2 8 In the Beckles case, the Court held that the residual
clause of the advisory Guidelines was not unconstitutionally vague because
"the advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges. '129 According to
the Fourth Circuit, this decision "demonstrates that quacking like [the] ACCA is not
enough to bring a challenge within the purview of the right recognized by
Johnson."30 Although the language in the residual clause of the advisory Guidelines
was identical to the residual clause of the ACCA,' 3 ' the court concluded it was
different because it did not "implicate the twin concerns underlying [the] vagueness
doctrine" in Johnson.'32 Thus, the analysis in Beckles should not foreclose a
challenge to the mandatory Guidelines using Johnson because the mandatory
Guidelines do implicate the twin concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine.
Recently, the Sixth Circuit decided another case on this issue.'33 The majority
opinion simply concluded that the three-judge panel was bound by the Sixth Circuit's
precedent inRaybon v. United States. 134 But Judge Moore wrote a concurring opinion
encouraging the court to hear this case en banc and overrule the Raybon precedent.'35
Judge Moore rejected the contention that the right announced in Johnson was limited
to individuals sentenced under the residual clause of the ACCA. 3 6 Following the
Supreme Court's conclusion that Dimaya was a "straightforward application" of the
principle announced in Johnson, Judge Moore concluded that cases involving the
residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines are even more straightforward because
the clauses are identically worded.'3 7 The Court in Dimaya struck down the INA's
residual clause because it contained the same two deficiencies as the ACCA clause
in Johnson.'38 The residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines is identical to the
ACCA residual clause and is subject to the categorical approach.139 The wording of
the mandatory Guideline's residual clause was even amended to reflect the language
from the residual clause of the ACCA.""4 As a result, "[l]ogic dictates that both
should suffer the same judgment."'' Judge Moore continued that applying Johnson
to the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines would not create a new rule.'42
Teague v. Lane provides that "a case announces a new nile if the result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final.' 143 But a case merely applying a principle that governed "a prior decision to a
128 United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Beck/es, 137 S. Ct. at 890).
129 Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 890.
130 Brown, 868 F.3d at 303.
131 Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 890.
132 Id. at 894.
133 See generally Chambers v. United States, 763 F. App'x 514 (6th Cir. 2019).
134 Id. at 516, 518.
135 Id. at 519 (Moore, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 521-22.
1
3
7 Id. at 522.
131 Id. at 523.
1
39 
id.
140 id
141 id.
142 Id. at 524.
143 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
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different set of facts" does not announce a new rule.'" This should have been the
end of the analysis, but the Raybon case misconstrued Beckles.
145
In Raybon, the Sixth Circuit relied on a footnote in Justice Sotomayor's
concurrence to conclude that whether Johnson applies to the mandatory Guidelines
is an open question.146 But the majority in Beckles "simply repeated... that, '[u]nlike
the ACCA, . . . the advisory Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of
sentences.""147 "Therefore, Booker and Johnson, together, dictate the answer to
Raybon's supposed 'open question' when mandatory Guidelines are at issue.
148
Finally, Judge Moore noted that when the Sentencing Commission removed the
residual clause from the advisory Guidelines, it determined that he Guidelines'
residual clause "implicates many of the same concerns cited by the Supreme Court
in Johnson."'49
Judge Moore's opinion in Chambers provides a compelling summary of the
arguments discussed in this Note. The residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines
suffers from the same two fatal deficiencies that invalidated the ACCA residual
clause. Following the Court's analysis in Dimaya, applying Johnson to the
mandatory Guidelines does not create a new rule, but instead is simply a
"straightforward application" of Johnson to a different set of facts.150
CONCLUSION
Although the majority of circuits has determined that individuals sentenced under
the residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines do not have a timely claim under
Johnson, a closer review of the Supreme Court decisions reveals that such petitioners
should have timely claims if they filed within a year of Johnson. The Dodd Court
made clear that the statute of limitations is based on the first clause in § 2255(f)(3).'5'
Reading a merits analysis into the statute of limitations emphasizes the wrong clause
of § 2255(f)(3). Thus, if the petitioners made a claim within a year of the asserted
right established in Johnson, the claim should be timely.
These petitioners should succeed on the merit of their claims as well because the
residual clause of the mandatory Guidelines has the same fatal flaws that made the
residual clause of the ACCA unconstitutionally vague. It contains the same
combined indeterminacy from the use of the categorical approach in conjunction
with estimating a "serious potential risk." Unlike the residual clause of the advisory
Guidelines that does not fix sentences, the residual clause of the mandatory
Guidelines does suffer from the same two fatal flaws. Therefore, the residual clause
'" Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347-48 (2013) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 307).
145 Chambers, 763 F. App'x at 524-25 (Moore, J., concurring).
1
46 Id. at 525.
1
47 Id. (quoting Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017)).
148 id.
149 Id. at 526 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C supp., amend. 798 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)).
"So Id. at 525; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018); Chaidez v. United States,
568 U.S. 342, 347-48 (2013).
"' Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S 353, 358 (2005).
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of the mandatory Guidelines should suffer the same fate as the unconstitutionally
vague residual clause in the ACCA.
The argument that the right in Johnson is narrowly defined does not stand up to
scrutiny. The Court's decision in Dimaya highlights the Court's application of a rule
that was already set out in Johnson. This understanding of Johnson supports the
conclusion that the decision in Johnson extends beyond the residual clause of the
ACCA. Although the Court has specifically taken up the issue on the advisory
Guidelines, that Court predicated the decision on the fact that the Guidelines were
advisory.I52 Unlike the advisory Guidelines, the mandatory Guidelines had the "force
and effect of law,"' 53 and they, thus, suffered from the same indeterminacy problems
as the residual clause in the ACCA statute.
This conclusion has important impacts. Justice Sotomayor noted in a dissent from
an order that this likely affects over 1,000 criminals currently in prison. 154 Given that
the purpose of the Career Offender Guideline is to fix a sentence at the statutory
maximum, criminals sentenced under the residual clause of the mandatory
Guidelines likely face enhanced sentences that they would not have otherwise
received. Although the circuits have pointed to a plausible interpretation concerning
relief for these criminals under § 2255, this Note demonstrates that such a view is
misguided in light of the Supreme Court's precedent following Johnson. The
Supreme Court's precedent counsels that Johnson established a right not to have a
sentenced fixed by a provision that is unconstitutionally vague. Therefore,
individuals who filed a timely motion within a year of Johnson have a meritorious
claim to be resentenced.
s2 Hfeckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
is Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154 Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 16 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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